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At the beginning of 2006 the Dutch government
introduced a fundamental reform of the health
insurance system. The aim of this reform was to
improve quality and efficiency of the health care sys-
tem by introducing a uniform health insurance sys-
tem and intensifying managed competition between
health insurers .In this paper we give an overview of
the key features of the reform.Moreover,we analyze
the short-term effects of the reform with regard to
financial consequences and consumer mobility.
Finally,we discuss the long-term consequences of the
reform and its implications for cross-country policy
learning.
Health insurance in the Netherlands: before and
after the reform
Before the 2006 health insurance reform in the
Netherlands, the health insurance system was com-
posed of four parts (see Figure 1).Two of these parts
– long term care insurance and supplementary pri-
vate health insurance – remained more or less
unchanged .However,the former social health insur-
ance scheme (Dutch abbreviation: ZFW) und the
former alternative private health insurance scheme
(PHI) ceased to exist. As a consequence of the
reform a new universal “private” social health insur-
ance scheme (ZVW) was established (see Figure 2
and Table 1).
Although the new health insurance scheme is exe-
cuted by private firms, regulation of the new univer-
sal health insurance system is essentially social . All
health insurers are obliged to accept all applicants;
premium rate restrictions do not allow risk-rated
premiums. For different risks, insurers are compen-
sated for by a health-based risk adjustment system.
The new health insurance scheme is compulsory for all
inhabitants of the Netherlands although there is no
control mechanism to seek out individuals who fail to
take out health insurance. All health insurers offer a
standardized basket of services.The Ministry of Health
determines an income-dependent premium, which is
the same for all health insurers (6.5 percent up to an
income ceiling of 30,015 euros p.a.). This income-
dependent premium is intended to cover 50 percent of
all expenditures of health insurers. Employers pay
employment-based, income-dependent premiums into
a central fund. Tax authorities determine income-
dependent premiums for all other income categories
(capital,self-employment,etc.),which are also paid into
the central fund.Individual health insurers receive risk-
adjusted capitation payments from the central fund.
Another 50 percent of expenditures are financed by
community-rated premiums. Community-rated pre-
miums differ among health insurers.Premium differ-
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ciency between health insurers to consumers. The
average community-rated premium was 1,060 euros
per year in 2006. Low-income individuals receive
premium subsidies. These premium subsidies are
based on individual need and are paid for by tax
money.The state also pays for the community-rated
premiums of children (up to 18 years).
Consumers are able to choose from a variety of dif-
ferent options. First they can choose between bene-
fits in cash (formerly provided only by private health
insurers) and benefits in kind (formerly provided
only by social health insurers).Moreover,consumers
are able to choose voluntary deductibles (up to
500 euros per year) and receive premium discounts
in return. Before the reform, this option was only
available with private health insurance. Fur-
thermore, health insurers are allowed to offer group
contracts and grant a premium discount in return in
the new health insurance system. They may also
offer preferred provider arrangements.
Consequences of the reform
The new universal health insurance system was
implemented in January 2006. A number of short-
term effects became obvious one year after the start
of the reform. First, we review the financial conse-
quences for private and public households as well as
for employers. Second, we analyze the rather dra-
matic consequences of the reform for consumer
mobility and the insurance market.
Financial consequences
Since the reform changed the premium calculation
of health insurers – for the former social health
insurance as well as the former private health insur-
ance – the impact of the reform on the purchasing
power of private households depends on the former
insurance status of individuals. Individuals who used
to be covered by social health insurance now pay a
higher community-rated premium and a lower
income-dependent premium. This effect is attenuat-
ed by the tax-financed subsidies for low-income
groups. The financial consequences for individuals
who used to be covered by private health insurance
primarily depend on the age of the individual con-
cerned.Young individuals used to pay low premiums
while the elderly used to pay high premiums.
Moreover, the Dutch government very carefully
tried to minimize negative financial consequences
for private households – e.g. by raising old-age pen-
sions and by increasing allowances for families with
children.
The government’s strategy to minimize negative
financial consequences of the reform has been most-
ly successful. According to a study by the Centraal
Planbureau (CPB), average purchasing power of pri-
vate households has increased by 1.5 percent in 2006.
This increase is attributed largely to the direct
(changes in premium calculation and premium subsi-
dies for low-income households) and indirect (com-
pensation measures such as the increase of
allowances for households with children) financial
consequences of the health insurance reform.
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Table 1 
Key elements of the Dutch health insurance reform
  Source: Greß et al. 2006.
Old system New system
Socialhealth insurance  Private health insurance  “Private” socialhealth
insurance
Clients Employees und self-
employed under income
ceiling (mandatory) 




30% of the population
All inhabitants (mandatory)
Premium calculation  Income dependent (85%)
Community rating (15%) 
No risk rating
Risk rating Income dependent (50%)
Community rating (50%) 
No risk rating
Benefits Standardized Individual Standardized
Benefits in kind or
benefits in cash Benefits in kind Benefits in cash Both
Voluntary deductibles  No Yes  Yes 
Group contracts  No Yes  Yes CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 65
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According to the CPB,80 percent of households have
more purchasing power after the reform while about
20 percent of households lost some purchasing power
after the reform (CPB – Centraal Planbureau 2006).
The consent of employers was crucial for the success
of the health insurance reform.The reform requires
employers to pay income-dependent premiums for
employees who used to be insured privately – which
resulted in an increase in the financial burden of
employers. However, the government tried to avoid
increasing the financial burden of employers as a
result of the reform. Thus, the income-dependent
premium and corporate taxes were slightly lowered.
As a consequence, the financial effect of the reform
on employers was neutralized (CPB – Centraal
Planbureau 2005).
The direct, short-term financial effects of the reform
for public households so far has been negligible.
Before the reform, the national government paid 3.6
billion euros into the central fund of social health
insurers. Since the reform, the government has paid
about the same amount for premium subsidies of
low-income households and for financing the com-
munity-rated premiums of children (CPB – Centraal
Planbureau 2005). However, this calculation does
not include additional expenditures for compensa-
tion measures for private households and employers
(see above). Moreover, in the long run expenditures
will increase if health care expenditures go up, and
community-rated premiums will increase. In that
case, expenditures for premium subsidies for low-
income households will also go up.
Price competition, market concentration and
consumer mobility
As a result of the reform, the health insurance mar-
ket in the Netherlands changed dramatically. Price
competition between health insurers became very
fierce, about one of five consumers changed health
insurers and the consolidation of the health insur-
ance market continued.
According to the calculation of the government, the
average community-rated premium in 2006 was
expected to be about 1,100 euros per year. Several
independent analysts and health insurers predicted
an average of between 1,250 euros and 1,300 euros
(Douven and Schut 2006a). However, the average
community-rated premium was 1,060 euros in 2006.
If premium discounts for group contracts are taken
into account, the average community-rated premium
was only 1,030 euros per year. This low rate was due
to two reasons. First, the Ministry of Health set a rate
for the income-dependent premium that was too high.
As a consequence,more than 50 percent of the expen-
ditures of health insurers are financed by income-
dependent premiums. Second, health insurers were
aware of the fact that consumer mobility in health
insurance markets – in the Netherlands and else-
where – is driven primarily by price (Laske-Aldershof
et al.2004).As a consequence,health insurers tried to
offer attractive community-rated premiums in order
to attract as many consumers as possible.They did so
primarily by designing low-priced group contracts
with employers. Most of them priced their policies
below costs. Resulting deficits had to be financed by
financial reserves (Douven and Schut 2006b). In 2007
the rate for the income-dependent premium stayed
constant while the average community-rated premi-
um increased by about 100 euros per year.
One of the most dramatic consequences of the
health insurance reform was a one-time increase of
consumer mobility. Before the reform, consumer
mobility and price sensitivity in the Dutch social
health insurance system was rather low (Greß et al.
2003; Schut et al. 2003). According to a NIVEL
(Netherlands Institute for Health Services
Research) study, about 21 percent of all consumers
changed to another health insurer in 2006.1 Fourteen
percent of consumers stayed with the same health
insurer but chose to take out another policy. It is
remarkable that the switching rates of persons who
were chronically ill was only slightly lower. The
dynamics of consumer mobility are driven primarily
by low-priced group contracts.Seventy-eight percent
of all group contracts are concluded by employers,
8 percent by unions and 2 percent by patient organi-
zations (De Jong et al. 2006a).
While consumer mobility was extremely high in
2006,consumers were reluctant to use the full extent
of new options to choose from. Seven percent of all
consumers chose a voluntary deductible – 93 percent
refrained from doing so. This number is rather low.
Thirty percent of consumers had a deductible before
the reform (De Jong et al. 2006b).
Although consumers may choose between 41 indi-
vidual health insurers, market concentration has
1 It is expected that consumer mobility will decrease to between
3 and 5 percent in 2007.increased considerably since the implementation of
the reform. The health insurance market is now
dominated by four conglomerates of health insurers
(VGZ-Groep, TRIAS-Groep, CZ/OZ and Achmea-
Groep). Formally these conglomerates consisted of
individual health insurers – both private and public
insurers. In fact, however, these individual insurers
are only labels of the consolidated conglomerate.
The four conglomerates amalgamate 22 individual
health insurers and have a joint market share of
80 to 90 percent. So far, the Dutch Competition
Authority has not intervened.
Conclusion
The introduction of a single health insurance system in
the Netherlands has provided more transparency for
consumers. The rather arbitrary separation between
social health insurance and private health insurance of
the past has been abolished. This is a major achieve-
ment,since policy makers in the Netherlands had tried
to introduce an universal health insurance system
since the early 1990s (Schut and Van de Ven 2005).The
distinction between public health insurers and private
health insures has disappeared. As a consequence, all
consumers are able to choose between all insurance
companies on the market – both the former public and
the former private health insurers – and from a variety
of other options. So far, group contracts of health
insurers and employers seem to be the key driver of
price competition and consumer mobility. Probably
the most important short-term effect of the reform is
the dramatic one-time increase of consumer mobility.
While consumer mobility was dormant before the
reform, consumers started actively comparing prices
and options after the introduction of the reform.This
is an important prerequisite for successful managed
competition (Greß 2006b).
While the short-term effects of the reform seem to be
in line with the intentions of policy makers,it remains
to be seen whether the same is true for the long-term
consequences of the reform. One key aim of reform
was that the new system should lead to a more effi-
cient provision of health care services. Health insur-
ers are able to contract selectively with health care
providers in outpatient as well as in inpatient care in
order to negotiate a favourable relationship between
quality and price for their consumers. The system of
health-based risk-adjustment provides incentives for
health insurers to attract consumers with chronic
conditions. However, so far competition between
health insurers is based on price only – group con-
tracts of patient groups with insurers are an impor-
tant exception. As a consequence, the quality of
health care services is not yet an important tool for
health insurers to attract consumers.
From a comparative perspective, the health insurance
reform in the Netherlands is a rather fascinating
example of cross-country policy learning. Some key
features of the Dutch reform such as the introduction
of a universal health insurance system,mandatory cov-
erage for the entire population,tax-financed premium
subsidies for low-income consumers and voluntary
deductibles can also be found in the Swiss health
insurance system.What is more,shortly after the intro-
duction of the reform in the Netherlands, policy mak-
ers in Germany became very interested in the design
of the new Dutch system. There was a steady flow of
Dutch experts – including the Minister of Health –
coming to Germany in the first half of 2006 in order to
explain the reform. As a result, some key features of
the health care reform 2007 in Germany look striking-
ly similar to the Dutch system: the introduction of a
central fund to allocate resources to health insurers,
mandatory coverage for the entire population, more
options for consumers to choose from (including vol-
untary deductibles), a uniform income- dependent
premium,a community-rated premium determined by
health insurers, health-based risk adjustment and
more instruments for health insurers to contract selec-
tively (Greß 2006a).However,one very important dif-
ference between Germany on the one hand and the
Netherlands and Switzerland on the other hand
remains: the rather arbitrary separation of social and
private health insurance in Germany.
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